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A pragmatic research philosophy is introduced that embraces mixed-method 
approaches to applied research questions. With its origins in the work of Peirce 
(1984), James (1907), Dewey (1931), and contemporary support from Rorty 
(1982, 1990,1991), pragmatism emphasizes the practical problems experienced 
by people, the research questions posited, and the consequences of inquiry. As 
a way to highlight applications of pragmatism in sport psychology, pragmatism 
is compared to constructivism and positivism in terms of philosophical 
underpinnings and methodological applications. The pragmatic researcher 
is sensitive to the social, historical, and political context from which inquiry 
begins and considers morality, ethics, and issues of social justice to be important 
throughout the research process. Pragmatists often use pluralistic methods 
during multiphase research projects. Exemplar design types are discussed that 
logically cohere to a pragmatic research philosophy.
Debate and discussion concerned with knowledge construction have 
occurred throughout the history of science (Wilson, 1998). In the sport and 
exercise psychology literature, discussions have focused on divisions between 
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the academic discipline and professional activities of applied practitioners, the 
appropriate sources of knowledge (e.g., interviews, observations, experiments), data 
analytic strategies (e.g., quantitative and/or qualitative), the underlying philosophies 
of various research methodologies, and the development of alternative paradigms 
(Brustad, 2002; Dewar & Horn, 1992; Dzewaltowski, 1997; Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 
1996; Krane, 1994; Krane, Andersen, & Strean, 1997; Martens, 1979, 1987). While 
these discussions have influenced the field of sport psychology, there is still a need 
to develop and accept alternative ways of examining human behavior within sport 
and physical activity contexts (Brustad, 2002; Dewar & Horn, 1992). Hence, this 
paper will characterize a pragmatic viewpoint about the nature of paradigmatic 
controversies and present an alternative position that is guided by the practical 
concerns of applied sport psychologists and their clients (i.e., coaches and athletes). 
Pragmatism, with origins in the work of Peirce (1984) and James (1907), is a 
philosophy of knowledge construction that emphasizes practical solutions to applied 
research questions and the consequences of inquiry. The purpose of this paper is 
to offer researchers and practitioners in sport psychology integrated approaches to 
knowledge construction that logically cohere to a pragmatic research philosophy.
The primary motivation for the present discussion stems from the longstanding 
gap between academic and applied sport psychology practice. Martens (1979) was 
perhaps the first to express concern about ecological validity of laboratory-based 
sport psychology research. He noted the gap between field-based observations and 
orthodox approaches to knowledge construction when he claimed, “experiential 
knowledge and common sense have been more appealing, and usually more 
beneficial, than knowledge from sport psychology research” (p. 95). Martens (1979, 
1987) recognized that reliance on orthodox scientific methods and a failure to pay 
attention to the unique sport and physical activity context lead to two divergent 
aspects of sport psychology, academic and applied. His solution was a heuristic 
approach that emphasized knowledge gained through field studies, idiographic, 
and introspective methods.
Brustad (2002) and others (Biddle, Markland, Gilbourne, Chatzisarantis, & 
Sparkes, 2001; Dewar & Horn, 1992) have called for the use of multiple methods and 
acceptance of alternative paradigms in the research process. Brustad (2002) noted 
“it is possible to use multi-method approaches to address any research question” 
(p. 34) while Hardy et al. (1996) offered the following: “At times it is best to use 
a qualitative methods, and at other times a quantitative approach. Because both 
methods have strengths and limitations, sometimes it may also be advisable to 
combine the two approaches” (p. 259). Consistent with these sentiments, we feel 
it is important to continue paradigmatic and epistemological discussion to advance 
the use of mixed-method forms of knowledge construction in sport psychology.
Another complimentary rationale for the present manuscript stems from 
findings reported by Culver, Gilbert, and Trudel (2003). They reviewed 485 
published studies in three major sport psychology journals (e.g., The Sport 
Psychologist, The Journal of Applied Sport Psychology, and the Journal of Sport and 
Exercise Psychology) to determine the number of studies that used qualitative (e.g., 
interviews, life histories, participant observation) versus quantitative methods (e.g., 
emphasis on numerical data and/or inferential statistics). Of particular interest here 
was that only 32 studies over a period of ten years used a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative techniques. This finding raises some interesting questions similar 
to those raised by Culver et al. (2003). First, are we to presume that many of the 
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important research questions in sport psychology can only be answered by one 
technique alone? And second, is it possible that multiple methods of data collection 
and analysis, used simultaneously, could answer important research questions more 
adequately? We argue the answer to question two is a resounding yes. In an attempt 
to back up this claim, we present an alternative philosophical and methodological 
paradigm for researchers and practitioners in applied sport psychology: pragmatism. 
What follows is a review of the historical roots of pragmatism. This review will 
provide the philosophical underpinnings of a pragmatic paradigm of knowledge 
construction for applied researchers in sport psychology. Then, specific design 
strategies and examples of published studies will be discussed followed by a review 
of pragmatic conceptions of validity in scientific inquiry.
Before giving a brief account of pragmatism, two caveats are in order. 
First, there are different forms of pragmatism and the reader is encouraged to 
see Murphy (1990), Diggins (1994), and Putnam (1995) to better understand the 
diverse representations of pragmatism. Our intent here is to present one form 
of pragmatism with the specific goal of offering applied researchers in sport 
psychology a philosophical and methodological framework for future research. 
Second, this work is intended to add to responsible and productive discussion 
surrounding the underlying assumptions of the research process (i.e., methodology) 
and the implications of adopting one paradigmatic approach over another. The 
arguments presented in this manuscript are consistent with the views of scholars 
who have encouraged acceptance and tolerance of diverse research epistemologies 
and methodologies in sport and exercise psychology (Biddle et al. 2001; Brustad, 
2002; Culver et al., 2003; Hardy et al., 1996; Krane, 1994; Krane et al., 1997; 
Strean & Roberts, 1992; Whaley, 2001).
An Introduction to Pragmatism
The word pragmatism comes from the Greek word, πρ	 	γµα, which means action 
from which the English words “practice” and “practical” were derived. The term 
was popularized by William James in his publication Pragmatism: A New Name for 
Some Old Ways of Thinking. For James, pragmatism was not a program for what he 
called “solving names” such as God or answering questions about an absolute truth. 
Rather, pragmatism was an attempt to provide practical solutions to contemporary 
problems experienced by people and society. In this light, pragmatic thought was 
a “method only” intended to change existing realities through concerted effort and 
continued work (James, 1907, p. 51). Especially important to James (1907) were 
the “respective practical consequences” of work, a concern that has implications 
for the present manuscript (p. 45).
In more recent years, Rorty (1982, 1990, 1991) has emerged as a proponent 
of pragmatism. Rorty argued that the concept of knowledge as an accurate 
representation of truth needed to be discarded. From this perspective, the methods 
and theories of empirical science or any other discipline (e.g., theology) are not 
capable of describing truth once and for all. Pragmatists deny there is single reality 
and see no way for scientists or others to determine whether their theories are 
closer to the truth than are their colleagues. For these reasons, pragmatists have 
abandoned discussions that concern the correspondence of theory and reality in 
favor of dialogues where the value of different types of knowledge are viewed as 
tools for helping us cope with and thrive within our environment (Rorty, 1990). 
′α
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Put simply, pragmatists opt for methods and theories that are more useful to us 
within specific contexts (e.g., answers to practical problems), not those that reveal 
underlying truths about the nature of reality. As Rorty noted, pragmatists are set 
apart from positivists and/or scientific realists who believe there is an objective 
truth or “God’s-eye view” of the world unobstructed by the influence of socio-
cultural conditions and subjective biases (Rorty, 1990, p. 2). Pragmatists view this 
purported truth as being “irrelevant to our needs and our practices” (Rorty, 1990, 
p. 2) because such a view would not account for the peculiarities of our world 
(Williams, 1985).
Pragmatists further recognize that scientific inquiry is contextual in nature 
and that the past and current social, historical, and political conditions strongly 
influence the scientific process. Dewey (1931) noted “They [general ideas] are the 
basis for organizing future observations and experience” (pp. 32-33) while Rorty 
(1982) claimed that all inquiry begins with and is guided by the previous discourse 
that researchers inherit from their predecessors.
In summary, pragmatists evaluate research findings based upon their practical, 
social, and moral consequences as well as their bearing on the human condition. 
They consider the problems under study and the specific research questions as 
more important than the underlying philosophical assumptions of the method. 
Pragmatists typically use one or more methods deemed appropriate to the specific 
research question being asked while simultaneously considering the consequences 
of such inquiry (Cherryholmes, 1992; Howe, 1988; Rorty, 1982).
Pragmatism and the Major Paradigms
In order to demonstrate the strengths and flexibility afforded by the pragmatic 
research tradition, a more specific discussion about philosophical issues in research 
is warranted. Rather than abandoning discussions of this kind, as Rorty (1991) 
suggested, we have chosen to take part in them in order to facilitate dialogue with 
proponents of other research paradigms. As a way to highlight the philosophical 
underpinnings of pragmatic thought, the discussion that follows will review 
important terms related to the research process. Also included in this discussion are 
examples of how two relatively dichotomous paradigmatic philosophies, positivism 
and constructivism, are unique from one another. Because of space limitations, 
discussions about the broad array of post-positivistic and non-positivistic 
viewpoints (e.g., cultural studies, feminist, critical theory) are beyond the scope 
of this manuscript; Lincoln and Guba (2000) provided an excellent review of these 
philosophies. Rather than present all of these viewpoints, our intent is to contrast 
the major philosophical assumptions of positivism and constructivism in order to 
shed light on a pragmatic philosophy.
Epistemology refers to theories of knowledge, the nature and source of 
legitimate knowledge, and the ability of research subjects/participants to possess 
knowledge (Childers & Hentzi, 1995). Ontology generally refers to questions 
about the nature of reality, that which is real, and whether an “objective” reality 
exists “independent of the researcher” (Creswell, 1994, p. 4). Positivists adopt 
objective epistemological and ontological views that assume the existence of a 
real or true reality that can be measured and understood with the application of 
scientific methods devoid of any human contamination or subjective bias. The 
positivist also believes that scientific findings can be generalized across time and 
22 • Giacobbi, Poczwardowski, and Hager Pragmatic Research Philosophy • 23 
in different contexts and their findings represent so called truths about the world 
devoid of the social, cultural, or historical context from which these findings were 
made (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).
In contrast, field based researchers and constructivists often embrace a 
subjective view of knowledge that is individualized and context specific (Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000). Generally speaking, a constructivistic philosophy focuses on the 
social, historical, and value driven process of knowledge claims and denies the 
existence of permanent (foundational) objective truths about reality. Thus for the 
constructivist, the epistemological and ontological positions embrace subjective 
views about reality constructed through transactions within the socially situated 
activities of people and communities (Lincoln & Guba, 2000).
The epistemological and ontological extremes represented by positivists 
and constructivists have lead to contentious debates within the social and 
behavioral sciences including sport psychology (Brustad 2002; Dewar & Horn, 
1992; Dzewaltowski 1997; Lincoln & Guba, 2000; Martens 1979, 1987). While 
positivists and constructivists appear to have dichotomous epistemological views 
(Lincoln & Guba, 2000), the pragmatist argues that a continuum exists between 
objective and subjective viewpoints the choice of which depends on the nature 
of the research question being asked and the particular point in the research 
process (Creswell, 2003; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, 2003). Because knowledge 
construction is contextual in nature and influenced by the cultural, political, and 
historical conditions of the day, the pragmatist equates objectivity with solidarity 
and agreement that occurs through discourse and transaction within and between 
communities of people (James, 1907). In short, pragmatists test the veracity of facts 
through dialogue, the usefulness and consequences of knowledge, and negotiations 
within communities, all of which require ongoing dialog.
Both pragmatists and constructivists agree that the consequences of scientific 
inquiry require reflection and analysis. Both approaches consider the practical, moral, 
and ethical consequences of knowledge construction as important considerations 
in research (Dewey, 1931; James, 1907). Like constructivists, pragmatists would 
encourage scholars and practitioners to engage in moral and ethical discussions 
before, during, and after the implementation of scientific findings (Dewey, 1931; 
Whaley, 2001). However, unlike more radical forms of constructivism (Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000 review the varying forms of constructivism), pragmatists consider 
agreement within a scientific community as a way to approach objectivity. For the 
pragmatist, total agreement, complete objectivity, and the search for some ultimate 
truth are not considered useful endeavors (James, 1907). Rather, agreement within 
communities may allow a practical level of truth to exist, but such practical truths 
are those findings that prove useful within specific contexts (James, 1907). In 
other words, the pragmatist prefers to avoid debate about whether constructivitic 
or positivistic conceptions of truth are more accurate. The pragmatist considers 
the practical concerns with human existence, the research questions being asked, 
and the consequences of inquiry, to be more important than which version of the 
truth is better than another (James, 1907). As James (1907) asked “What difference 
would it practically make to any one if this notion rather than that notion were 
true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean 
practically the same thing” (p. 45). With continued work and an examination of 
consequences, knowledge claims may be supported by the weight of evidence 
available and the logical arguments used to apply those claims. For instance, 
22 • Giacobbi, Poczwardowski, and Hager Pragmatic Research Philosophy • 23 
sport psychology researchers and/or practitioners may test psychological 
interventions to improve sport performance. If agreement within a community 
were established that a specific intervention improved sport performance, then 
pragmatists would consider such agreement about research findings to approach 
an objective position.
Another epistemological debate concerns the issue of time and context free 
generalizations. The pragmatist argues that scientists must be aware of the context 
within which research applications take place. Because time and context free 
generalizations tend to discount or eliminate the role of social-historical-contextual 
factors on human experience (Lincoln & Guba, 2000), a pragmatist would not be 
inclined to make such claims. Science, knowledge construction, and the practical 
concerns of people require ongoing deliberations about the use and benefits of 
knowledge at a particular time or place. Again, the iterative nature of knowledge 
construction requires scientists to continuously reexamine the application of 
research findings in many different contexts. This does not necessarily mean that 
scientific findings must be replicated continuously. Rather, the application and 
consequences of science must be reflected upon to ensure practical utility, social 
value, and fairness to anyone who might be or could be impacted by research 
findings.
Research Methods
Research methods are procedures, tools, or strategies of doing research while 
methodology refers to larger issues in the research process such as why particular 
methods are chosen (Smith, 1989). In other words, methods are equated with specific 
design elements and strategies of inquiry such as how to recruit participants, the type 
of data collected (i.e., numeric versus interview based); methodology is more closely 
linked to philosophical issues within the research process. For example, positivists 
believe only objective, tightly controlled, directly observable empirical data provide 
legitimate knowledge; therefore, experimental designs within contrived settings and 
quantitative representations of data are typically chosen. A positivist might approach 
the study of psychological stress by creating a contrived laboratory task that mimics 
a real world competition scenario. This approach may yield meaningful data about 
particular research questions, but the context with which stress and competition 
occur in actual athletic settings would not be readily apparent from the data. In 
contrast, constructivists disavow objective claims about reality and embrace time 
and context dependent explanations about knowledge that are explored through life 
histories, interviews, or participant observation. Elaborating on the example above, 
a constructivist would interview an athlete immediately following several athletic 
contests to understand an athlete’s perceptions of competition stress. While mixing 
methods from different paradigms is possible, desirable, and often productive, the 
underlying assumptions of various paradigms (i.e., constructivists versus positivism) 
may contradict one another (Krane & Baird, in press; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). In 
other words, a constructivist may use quantitative data but will adopt a subjective 
epistemology, while a positivist who uses a post-experiment interview will do so 
under an objective epistemology.
Pragmatists are trained in, and “use pluralistic approaches to derive 
knowledge about the problem” under study (Creswell, 2003, p. 12). Because of 
the epistemological continuum noted above, the pragmatist will often use multiple 
and/or mixed method designs within single investigations and in an iterative 
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programmatic manner over several investigations. What follows is a review of 
some mixed-method design strategies that cohere to a pragmatic philosophy.
Mixed-Method Research
Mixed-method research involves a combination of procedures where two or more 
data collection techniques and forms of analyses are used and both contribute to 
the final results (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). As discussed by Creswell (2003) and 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998), mixed-method research involves both data collection 
techniques and analyses because the data collected dictates the analyses performed. 
In the following sections, we will review and adapt the mixed-method designs 
described by Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) to the work of applied researchers 
in sport and exercise psychology. Specifically, we will discuss equivalent status 
designs, dominant-less-dominant designs, and designs with multilevel uses. Within 
this discussion, examples of published research studies that resemble the design 
types being reviewed here will be highlighted.
Equivalent Status Designs
Equivalent status designs can involve both qualitative and quantitative approaches in 
either temporal order. Consistent with a pragmatic epistemology, researchers and/or 
practitioners who are trained in multiple methods often favor the equivalent status 
design. With this design, both qualitative and quantitative approaches contribute 
equally to the final results, the results of phase one somehow inform phase two, and 
neither approach is viewed as more important than the other (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 
1998). For instance, Gould, Udrey, Tuffey, and Loehr (1996a) and Gould Tuffey, 
Udrey, and Loehr (1996b), in two stages, assessed the levels of burnout experienced 
by competitive junior tennis players. In the first stage, a battery of measures was 
administered to 62 junior tennis players and discriminant function analysis helped 
identify the defining psychological characteristics of burned out players. Then, 10 
participants who scored highest on measures of burnout and perfectionism were 
interviewed to shed further light on the psychological characteristics of burned out 
junior tennis players. Although the two studies independently contributed to our 
knowledge of burned out junior tennis players, the value of this two-stage approach 
was made evident by the authors’ conclusions regarding the salience placed on social 
psychological factors by the 10 interview participants, and the support offered to 
Smith’s (1986) cognitive-affective stress model of burnout. In this case, both stages 
of data collection provided useful information to help scientists and practitioners 
identify the characteristics and experiences of burned out junior tennis players.
Alternatively, Strean (1998) discussed another potential application of 
qualitative methods as researchers can use interview data as a basis for designing 
survey measures. This approach is consistent with an equivalent status design as long 
as both studies contribute independently to new knowledge and study one somehow 
informs study two. For instance, Conroy, Poczwardowski, and Henschen, (2001) 
used interviews to enhance understanding of individuals’ emotional responses to 
failure in stage one. Their interviews, along with extensive theorizing about the 
fear of failure construct, formed the theoretical rationale toward the development 
of items for the Fear Appraisal Inventory designed and psychometrically tested 
during stage two (Conroy, Willow, & Metzler, 2002). The findings from both 
studies provided researchers and practitioners a practical means to assess fear of 
24 • Giacobbi, Poczwardowski, and Hager Pragmatic Research Philosophy • 25 
failure within the context of sport, and both studies independently contributed new 
knowledge to the literature.
Equivalent status designs could also involve both qualitative and quantitative 
data collection techniques used in a parallel or simultaneous manner. As with 
the study designs described above, this form of data collection involves dual 
and equal contributions to the final results by both qualitative and quantitative 
forms of data collection and analysis. Chase, Lirgg, and Feltz (1997) presented 
an excellent example of an equivalent status design. They simultaneously tested 
aspects of Bandura’s (1977, 1986) self-efficacy theory while inductively building 
a new theory concerned with the information used by coaches to form efficacy 
judgments. Specifically, Bandura’s previous theoretical writings influenced the 
authors’ theoretical rationale, the study design, and creation of items to measure 
coaches’ efficacy. The authors also used an inductive open-ended approach and 
created a conceptual framework of important sources of efficacy information used 
by coaches. In this case, the conceptual framework developed from the inductive 
analysis of coaches’ open-ended responses were usefully combined with the 
quantitative analyses and both forms of data were used to support the authors’ 
conclusions that coaches’ efficacy expectations can influence the performance of 
athletes.
Dominant-Less Dominant Design
Another mixed-method approach involves the use of one dominant method while a 
relatively smaller part of the study uses an alternative method. The dominant-less 
dominant design may appeal to researchers or practitioners who strongly favor one 
research approach, but collaboration with researchers who have different training 
and/or epistemological viewpoints is needed. For instance, Chaffin and Imreh (2002) 
assessed the practice of a concert pianist as she learned Presto, of J. S. Bach’s Italian 
Concerto. In this study, the researchers were interested in the performance cues 
(e.g., features of music attended to during performance) identified by the learner for 
the Presto to determine whether there were specific places during the piece more 
difficult to remember than others. The main unit of analysis was the number of 
starting or stopping places identified through audio recordings during an extended 
learning period. Secondary data collection involved a post experiment interview 
concerned with when the learner was thinking about the identified performance 
cues during memory runs and a recorded performance. In this case, the researchers 
used the interview data in a less dominant manner as a manipulation check of their 
quantitative findings.
A second approach to the dominant-less dominant design would involve the 
simultaneous or parallel collection of both qualitative interview and quantitative 
survey data. For instance, Gould, Dieffenbach, and Moffett (2002) interviewed 
32 Olympic champions, their coaches, and a parent or guardian to examine 
the psychological characteristics of the athletes. At the same time, the authors 
administered a battery of survey measures to compliment their interview data. 
Although the authors contended that qualitative interviews were the primary 
methods used, their results were presented and discussed in a complimentary 
manner thus fitting the description of a parallel-simultaneous dominant-less 
dominant design. The value of this design was that both forms of data collection, 
with a unique and difficult-to-attain participant population, allowed the researchers 
to bring multiple epistemological views and interpretations to the research process. 
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The simultaneous/parallel dominant-less dominant design type is ideally suited to 
the work of applied sport psychologists who might have unique opportunities to 
collect diverse forms of data with small numbers of athletes or significant others 
within the athletic context.
Multilevel Approaches
While the preceding sections of this manuscript have focused on design issues, 
recent developments in statistics offer potential new design formulations in applied 
sport psychology. Specifically, the advent of multilevel modeling and specifically 
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM: Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) can help researchers 
address pervasive design challenges in the social and behavioral sciences. 
Researchers in sport psychology (Pasevich, Estabrooks, Brawley, & Carron, 
2001) and other disciplines (Arnold, 1992; Goldstein, 1995; Morris & Normand, 
1992; Rosenberg, 1973) have noted the challenges associated with hierarchical or 
nested structures within the social and behavioral sciences. Pasevich et al. (2001) 
claimed that athletic teams can be conceptualized as groups nested within larger 
organizational units, while factors at each group level may differentially impact 
performance. If repeated observations are collected with a group of athletes from 
different teams, athletes on the same team would likely exhibit more similarities 
to one another than athletes on different teams. The observation that individual, 
group, and organizational factors are unique entities leads to violations of statistical 
independence and any between group differences would be unaccounted error 
variance using traditional statistics (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). To analyze 
multilevel data of this nature, HLM analyses allow researchers to assess individual 
behavior while controlling for the unique variability associated with moderator 
variables such as group membership, level of athletic competition (Raudenbush 
& Bryk, 2002), and personality characteristics (David, Green, Martin, & Suls, 
1997). While applications of HLM remain scant in sport and exercise psychology 
(see Giacobbi, Hausenblas, & Frye, 2005, for an exception), Pasevich et al. (2001) 
noted the vast potential of HLM to address many important research questions in 
sport and exercise psychology.
Multilevel research can also be used to collect quantitative data on one level 
and qualitative data on another. For instance, a sport psychologist working or 
doing research with collegiate athletes could administer the Group Environment 
Questionnaire (Brawley, Carron, & Widmeyer, 1987) to athletes from various 
schools. At the same time, the researcher could interview coaches and athletic 
directors to better understand how group level variables such as institutional, 
academic, and athletic priorities are related to interactions within teams. The 
coach/athletic director data could be used to make the athlete level data more 
meaningful and understandable, and vice versa. Multilevel approaches can be used 
simultaneously or sequentially.
In summary, equivalent status designs involve two stages of data collection 
with either form of inquiry preceded by the other. Both elements of the design 
involve dual contributions to the literature and data collected in stage one somehow 
informs data collected in stage two. The dominant-less dominant design also 
involves either form of inquiry followed by the other with one method forming 
the dominant unit of analysis. Another variant of the dominant-less dominant design 
would comprise two forms of data collected in a parallel or simultaneous manner. 
Similar to equivalent status designs, dominant-less-dominant designs allow the 
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use of objective and subjective viewpoints, diverse forms of data collection, and 
the possibility of multiple ways to interpret the data. As long as epistemological 
differences can be put aside and researchers adopt the pragmatic maxims, these 
design strategies could provide a useful way for researchers and practitioners to 
engage in collaborative projects to address applied research questions. Finally, 
multilevel approaches offer pragmatic researchers new and innovative ways 
to advance applied research. We would argue that familiarity with multilevel 
approaches could lead to creative new strategies for mixed-method researchers. 
The focus now turns to pragmatic conceptions of validity.
A Pragmatic Critique of Validity in Science
A positivist embraces rigid criteria and the application of accepted methods to make 
validity claims. This position considers the application of rigorous or foundational 
criteria as a means to gain scientific truths unimpeded by human bias (Lincoln 
& Guba, 2000). In contrast, constructivists, like pragmatists, reject permanent 
or universal truths and instead argue that valid truth arises out of relationships, 
negotiations, or dialog between members of communities (Lincoln & Guba, 2000; 
Sparkes, 1998). In this light, pragmatic conceptions of validity call for extended 
discussions about the practical utility, role, and impact of science within specific 
contexts (Dewey, 1931; James, 1907). Classical pragmatists, like Peirce (1984) 
and Dewey (1931), explicitly discussed the consequences and outcomes of inquiry 
(i.e., practical, ethical, and moral) because research outcomes are directly linked to 
claims about validity in the scientific process. As such, these outcomes should be 
viewed as guiding principles that require ongoing discussions about the application 
of research in sport psychology.
From a pragmatic perspective, research findings, outcomes, and consequences 
require dialog and discussion within the scientific community. Since morality and 
ethics are part of the scientific process (Bernard, 2000), the pragmatic moral/
ethical rule is to continuously reflect on the many possible consequences of 
scientific inquiry. Dewey considered two ethical perspectives for the scientist to 
consider. The first perspective occurs at the front end of inquiry and is concerned 
with the overarching ideals, values, and purposes that guide inquiry. The second 
perspective is the test of consequences that occurs when research results are applied 
or disseminated in some practical manner. Along these lines, we consider the 
following questions, similar to those discussed by Whaley (2001), to be important 
for researchers to consider: (a) What questions are being addressed and are these 
questions relevant to the individuals being examined and/or society as a whole? 
(b) Who are the participants? Is the research sample diverse in terms of race, age, 
ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and sexual orientation? (c) What implications do 
the study findings have for diverse groups of individuals? If the findings do not 
generalize to diverse groups, do the study authors address these limitations? (d) 
Finally, are attempts made to disseminate the study findings to people who might 
benefit from this knowledge (e.g., coaches, athletes, psychologists)? We agree 
with Whaley’s (2001) proposal that researchers should consider reflections about 
the research questions being asked, who should be sampled, why the sample was 
chosen, and how researchers choose to practice science as integral to scientific 
advancement and the promotion of social justice. Such questions are important 
for applied researchers throughout the research process and are consistent with 
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the pragmatic moral and ethical views described above.
The contemporary writings of Schwandt (1996) and Messick (1995) also 
evoked pragmatic conversations about validity. Schwandt (1996) argued for the 
development of a “practical philosophy” where inquiry is judged by how well 
research reports stimulate judgment, “practical wisdom,” and dialog between 
“critical parties to the research encounter” (p. 69). Schwandt noted the biggest 
challenge for the “practical philosopher” involves the application of general theories 
or principles to particular cases (i.e., deduction). Schwandt (1996) claimed “The aim 
of such inquiry is not to replace practitioners’ common sense knowledge of their 
respective joint practices with allegedly more sophisticated, theoretical, scientific 
knowledge but to encourage practitioners to critically reflect on and reappraise 
their commonsense knowledge” (p. 64). The practical application of scientific 
findings is especially important for the work of applied sport psychologists and/or 
the scientist-practitioner where knowledge dissemination about the ethical and 
valid delivery of psychological services requires continuous reflection, dialog, 
and public discourse.
Messicks’s notion of “consequential validity” is consistent with Schwandt’s 
(1996) call for ongoing dialog and discussion between those involved with, or 
impacted by, the research process. While Messick’s critique is specific to the 
validation of psychological tests and measures, there are close parallels to lessons 
learned in the sport psychology literature. For instance, the valid and ethical use 
of personality inventories in sport is an important issue (Vealey, 2002). When 
practitioners use and market personality inventories as screening tools or make 
predictive claims about sport performance, issues of consequential validity are 
raised. Without extensive testing and evidence to form the basis of such claims, 
personality tests should not be used or marketed in such a manner (Vealey, 2002). 
In short, any use or application of psychological tests or principles would raise 
pragmatic issues of validity and dialog between communities of people would be 
encouraged.
Conclusion
The pragmatic philosophy presented in this manuscript offers a variety of potential 
applications in sport psychology. We discussed examples of published studies that 
used mixed-methods of analysis in the applied sport psychology literature. As 
a concluding point, we feel it is important to note that we do not encourage the 
“atheoretical” practice of science. Rather, we would argue the use of mixed methods 
within a pragmatic philosophy would help address applied research questions from 
a theoretical perspective. James (1907) offered the following perspective about how 
pragmatism could influence the way theories are used in science:
Theories thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas 
in which we can rest. We don’t lie back upon them, we move 
forward, and, on occasion, make nature over again by their aid. 
Pragmatism unstiffens all our theories, limbers them up and sets 
each one at work. (p. 52)
By embracing an eclectic research approach, and by considering the 
consequences of inquiry, future collaborations between academic and applied 
sport psychologists might be enhanced. It is our hope that the pragmatic research 
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philosophy presented here will open doors to collaborative opportunities for 
individuals interested in exploring applied research questions from multiple 
perspectives.
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